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What Happened to the Public’s
Interest in Patent Law?
By Kristen Jakobsen Osenga
Note from the Editor:
This article discusses the role of the concept of the public interest
in patent law, and it criticizes recent trends among judges toward
using the public interest to refuse to enjoin patent infringement.
The Federalist Society takes no positions on particular legal and
public policy matters. Any expressions of opinion are those of
the author. Whenever we publish an article that advocates for a
particular position, as here, we offer links to other perspectives
on the issue, including ones opposed to the position taken in the
article. We also invite responses from our readers. To join the
debate, please email us at info@fedsoc.org.
• Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d
1089 (W.D. Wash. 2012), https://www.leagle.com/decision/
infdco20120515d16.
• In the Matter of Certain Mobile Electronic Devices and
Radio Frequency and Processing Components Thereof, Inv.
337-TA-1065 (Sept. 28, 2018) (Notice Regarding Final Initial
Determination and Recommended Determination), https://www.
usitc.gov/press_room/documents/337_1065_id.pdf.
• Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, &
the Public Interest, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (2012), http://
cornelllawreview.org/files/2013/02/Chien-Lemley.pdf.
• Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 Mich.
Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2017), https://repository.law.umich.
edu/mttlr/vol21/iss1/1/.
• James Edwards, ITC’s Chance to Restore Reason and the Public
Interest in the Qualcomm v. Apple Case, IP Watchdog (Nov. 8,
2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/11/08/itcs-chance-torestore-reason-and-the-public-interest-in-the-qualcomm-applecase/id=103078/.

Protecting intellectual property is the government’s most
important tool to encourage innovation, as our country has
understood since its founding.1 The Constitution provides for
the grant of exclusive patent rights to “promote the progress of
science and the useful arts.”2 Thomas Jefferson, who was initially
skeptical of the value of patents, later remarked, “An Act of
Congress authorising [sic] the issuing patents for new discoveries
has given a spring to invention beyond my conception.”3 From the
very first patent, issued in 1790, to the 10 millionth patent, issued
in June 2018,4 the United States has seen remarkable amounts of
invention and innovation largely due to its strong patent system.
A strong patent system is one that effectively provides exclusive
rights for invention and innovation.
The American public benefits from innovations incentivized
by this patent system and relies ever more on new technologies
to make life more productive, enjoyable, and comfortable.
Given these benefits, one might think that the public interest in
maintaining a patent system with strong incentives for inventors
would be unquestioned; for a long time, it was. Recently, though,
judges in patent cases have begun to erode the rights of patentees
for the purported purpose of protecting the public’s interest.5 Has
the public’s interest really changed? This article examines shifting
interpretations of the public’s interest in patent law and explains
why an accurate understanding of the public interest actually
requires us to restore our strong patent system to encourage
innovation.
I. The Public’s Interest in Patent Law
Patent law performs a balancing act between promoting
innovation and protecting competition.6 On one hand, patents
are property rights given to encourage inventors to create,

1 See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and the
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause
of the United States Constitution, 2 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1 (1994).
2 U.S. Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 8.
3 Letter from Jefferson to Benjamin Vaughan (June 27, 1790) in 16
Papers of Jefferson (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1956-92) 579, cited
in Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy,
Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 993, 1030-32
(2006). For additional historical context, see also Sean M. O’Connor,
The Overlooked French Influence on the Intellectual Property Clause, U.
Chi. L. Rev. 733 (2015); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas
Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in
Historical Context, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 953 (2007).
4 See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Press Release 18-12, United States
Issues Patent Number 10,000,000, June 19, 2018, available at https://
www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/united-states-issues-patentnumber-10000000.
5 To be fair, there are other issues that also threaten to erode a strong U.S.
patent system, such as the uncertainty surrounding patent eligible subject
matter. However, this article is focused only on the use of the “public
interest” to weaken patent protection.

About the Author:
Kristen Osenga is Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School
of Law.

200

6 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989); Roger Allan Ford, The Uneasy Case for Patent Federalism, 2017
Wisc. L. Rev. 551, 568 (further describing this balance as “careful” and
“delicate”).
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commercialize, and disclose their new technologies.7 The public
has an interest in innovation—that is how it accesses new and
improved technology and products. To incentivize innovation,
the U.S. government grants patents that give their holders the
right to exclude others for a limited time from making, using,
selling, offering for sale, or importing the technology covered by
those patents.8 On the other hand, this right to exclude creates a
limited monopoly, which is the antithesis of principles underlying
competition law.9 The public also has an interest in a competitive
market that produces better products at lower prices.10 Patent
law creates “an exception to the general rule against monopolies”
and balances the public’s conflicting interests in innovation and
competition by granting patents only for inventions that warrant
such a reward.11 Because of the careful balance struck by the patent
system—with a high bar for patentability and a time limit on the
monopoly given—as well as the importance of patents as part of
a larger economic scheme, it is generally accepted that respecting
patent rights is in the public interest.12
Outside of the general notion of the public’s interest in an
effective and reliable patent system, the topic of “public interest”
is rarely discussed in patent law. The primary exception is in the
imposition of remedies for patent infringement. District court
judges are required to consider the public interest as a factor when
deciding whether to grant an injunction against a party found to

7 See, e.g., Richard B. Klar, Ebay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC: The Right
to Exclude Under U.S. Patent Law and the Public Interest, 88 J. Pat. &
Trademark Off. Soc’y 852, 858 (2006).
8 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
9 See, e.g., Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law & the Economics of
Preemption, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 959, 973 (1991) (“The law has presumed
since at least the Statute of Monopolies that only the antithesis of free
competition, the grant of exclusive rights, will suffice to stimulate the
optimal level of new creation.”).
10 See, e.g., Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?,
83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1943, 1952 (2016) (“Increased competition is a clear
public benefit. . . .”).
11 Precision Instrument Mfg. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery,
324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (“A patent by its very nature is affected
with a public interest. . . . It is an exception to the general rule against
monopolies and to the right to access a free and open market. The farreaching social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give
the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring
from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and
that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.”). See also
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“The balance between
the interest in motivating innovation and enlightenment by rewarding
invention with patent protection on one hand, and the interest in
avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition on the other,
has been a feature of the federal patent laws since their inception.”).
12 See, e.g., Amazon.com Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com Inc., 73 F.Supp.2d
1228, 1248-49 (W.D. Wash. 1999), vacated and remanded, 239
F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The public has a strong interest in the
enforcement of intellectual property rights. The purpose of the patent
system is to reward inventors and provide incentives for further
innovation by preventing others from exploiting their work. . . .
Encouraging [the patent owner] to continue to innovate—and forcing
competitors to come up with their own new ideas—unquestionably best
serves the public interest.”).
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be infringing a patent.13 At the International Trade Commission
(ITC), administrative law judges (ALJs) are statutorily required
to consider the public interest before issuing an exclusion order to
prevent importation of infringing goods into the United States.14
Although both doctrines involve the public’s interest, courts have
noted that they differ due to the “long standing principle that
importation is treated differently than domestic activity.”15
At the stage when judges consider the public interest, the
party who is facing an injunction (at the district court) or an
exclusion order (at the ITC) has already been found liable for
infringing a valid patent. One might assume a judge would
determine that the public interest supports allowing infringement
to occur rather than maintaining strong patent rights only in
extraordinary cases. In the past, this has been true, but judges
are increasingly invoking the public interest to deny injunctive
relief. Before arguing that this shift in how judges think about
the public interest is a problem that must be fixed, this article will
describe the role the public interest is supposed to play at both
the district courts and the ITC.
II. Public Interest at the District Courts
In patent infringement cases decided by district courts, the
question of the public’s interest arises when a judge determines
whether to grant an injunction that would prohibit the infringer
from continuing to infringe. Historically, permanent injunctions
were issued against parties found to be infringing nearly as a matter
of course.16 The courts based this rule on the “belief that once
infringement has been established denying a patentee the right
to exclude is contrary to the laws of property.”17
Despite this general rule in favor of injunctions, courts
would very occasionally deny injunctive relief to protect the public
interest.18 For example, in the 1930s, the Seventh Circuit denied
an injunction in a case where enjoining the infringer’s use of the
patented technology would leave an “entire community without
any means for disposal of raw sewage.”19 In the 1980s, the Federal
Circuit declined to issue an injunction where to do so would “cut
off the supply of . . . test kits for cancer patients.”20 These are fairly
13 See Section II., infra.
14 See Section III., infra.
15 See Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
16 See, e.g., MercExchange, LLC, v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
17 See Klar, supra note 7, at 855 (citing 35 U.S.C. §154; Honeywell Int’l Inc.
v. Universal Sys. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D. Del. 2004).
18 See, e.g., Rite-Hite v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547-48 (en banc) (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001
(C.D. Cal. 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (injunction
denied in case involving medical test kits), Vitamin Technologists,
Inc. v. Wisc. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945)
(injunction denied in case involving irradiation of margarine), and City
of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934)
(injunction denied in a case involving sewage disposal)).
19 See City of Milwaukee, 69 F.2d at 593.
20 See Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1458.
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uncontroversial examples of how the public’s interest in health and
safety may outweigh the public’s interest in effective and reliable
patent rights. With few exceptions, until 2006, injunctions were
routinely granted unless there was a showing of strong public
interest involving health and safety.21
The situation changed in 2006 when the Supreme Court, in
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, determined the Federal Circuit’s
presumption in favor of issuing a permanent injunction in cases of
patent infringement was in error.22 The Supreme Court instructed
lower courts to instead consider a four-factor test “according to
well-established principles of equity” when deciding whether
to issue permanent injunctions.23 A post-eBay plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief is required to show:
1. that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
2. that monetary damages are inadequate to compensate
for that injury;
3. that the balance of the hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant weighs in favor of the plaintiff; and
4. that the public interest would not be disserved by the
injunction.24
After eBay, courts often paid lip service to the four-factor test,
but continued to issue injunctions in the vast majority of cases.25
More recently, however, courts have used the discretion
afforded by the eBay four-factor test to effect policy through denial
of injunctive relief. For example, courts have focused on the first
two factors—irreparable harm and adequate remedy—to deny
injunctions to patent assertion entities.26 Patent assertion entities
have been defined in various ways, but most commonly they are
firms that generate income by purchasing patents and litigating
against, or licensing to, other companies that are using the
technology covered by the patent.27 Courts have also often found
the public interest to be disserved by grant of injunctions when
21 For one of the more amusing exceptions, see CF Inflight, Ltd. v. Cablecam
Sys., Ltd., No. CI.A 03-CV-5374, 2004 WL 234372, at 9 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 30, 2004) (in a case involving aerial photography of the Super
Bowl, a judge denied a preliminary injunction in view of the public
interest, stating, “While there may not exist a compelling concern for
public health, there is most certainly a public demand and interest in
experiencing this visual perspective.”).
22 547 U.S. 388, 393-394 (2006).
23 See id.
24 Id. at 391.
25 See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation
After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1949, 1982-1983
(2016) (finding an injunction issued in approximately three-quarters of
cases post-eBay).
26 See id. at 1988-89 (finding injunctions were granted in only 16% of cases
involving patent assertion entities); Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent
Remedies, 67 U. Miami L. Rev. 95, 111 (2012) (noting that patent
assertion entities “are hard pressed to get an injunction” post-eBay).
27 See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Sticks and Stones: How the FTC’s Name-Calling
Misses the Complexity of Licensing-Based Business Models, 22 Geo. Mason
L. Rev. 1001, 1014-1016 (2015) (discussing the varying definitions
given to patent assertion entities, also known as non-practicing entities or
patent trolls).
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the plaintiff is a patent assertion entity, although they typically
rely more on the other factors.28 In other cases, courts have used
the public’s interest to delay, rather than deny, injunctive relief,
giving an infringer time to design around the infringed patent
before being enjoined from infringing.29
Additionally, courts have begun using the four-factor test,
including the public interest factor, to deny injunctive relief to
companies that participate in standard setting organizations
and have asserted standard essential patents (SEPs). The Federal
Circuit has unequivocally stated that injunctive relief is available
for infringement of SEPs, subject to the eBay four-factor test.30
In fact, the Federal Circuit notes, “the public has an interest in
encouraging participation in standard-setting organizations.”31
However, courts have still sometimes held that the public interest
in accessing infringing products incorporating SEP technology
outweighs its interest in respecting the patentee’s property rights.32
III. Public Interest at the ITC
In the district courts, the public’s interest has been interjected
via common law and the Supreme Court’s eBay decision. But the
public interest is part of the ITC’s statutory scheme. As in district
court, the public interest becomes important at the remedy stage,
after patent infringement has been found. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)
(1) states that:
If the Commission determines . . . that there is a violation
. . ., it shall direct that the articles concerned . . . be excluded
from entry into the United States, unless, after considering
the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States
economy, the production of like or directly competitive
articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it
finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry.33
When the statute was enacted, a Senate Committee explicitly
noted that the enumerated concerns could override the
exclusionary rights of the patentee.34
28 See Seaman, supra note 25, at 1995 (finding that in 52% of the cases
where an injunction was denied the court also found an injunction
would disserve the public interest).
29 See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 704 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (allowing a 20-month delay before providing an injunctive remedy
because “an immediate permanent injunction would adversely affect the
public”).
30 See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir.
2014). A standard essential patent (SEP) is one that covers an aspect or
component of a technology standard and is necessarily infringed when a
standard-compliant device is made or used or when a standard-compliant
service is performed.
31 See id. at 1332.
32 For example, in a case involving a number of SEPs owned by Motorola, a
judge determined that the public interest required Microsoft to be able
to continue its business operations because of the presence of SEPs and
because Microsoft’s consumers rely on being able to use the infringing
products. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1103
(W.D. Wash. 2012).
33 19 U.S.C. §1337(d)(1).
34 See S. Rep. No. 93-1298, at 35 (1974).
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In recent years, the ITC approved new regulations which,
among other things, moved the public interest to the forefront
of the ITC’s analysis. A complainant must file, “concurrently
with the complaint, a separate statement of public interest”
explaining how the requested relief would affect public health
and welfare, competitive conditions, competitive articles, and
U.S. consumers.35 Respondents and others may file responses
to the patentee’s public interest statement. This shift permitted
additional fact-finding on matters of public interest,36 but the
crux of the public interest analysis occurs when the judge decides
whether to issue an exclusion order.
Although it is specifically provided for in the statute, ITC
judges have rarely invoked the public interest to deny an exclusion
order; injunctive relief is issued in nearly all cases in which the
ITC finds patent infringement.37 In fact, in the forty years prior
to 2018, the ITC determined that the public interest trumped
issuance of an exclusion order in only four cases.38 Two cases from
the 1980s involved fairly clear-cut issues of public health and
safety. In one case, the ITC declined to issue an exclusion order
barring import of specialized hospital beds for burn victims where
the domestic producer of the beds could not meet demand and
there were no therapeutically comparable beds available in the
U.S.39 In another case, the ITC did not exclude acceleration tubes
required for basic atomic research because the imported tubes were
of a higher quality than those available from domestic suppliers
and “basic scientific research . . . is precisely the kind of activity
intended by Congress” when considering the public health and
welfare.40 In 1997, the ITC stated expressly that, unless a case
involved drugs or medical devices, it was unlikely that it would
meet the public interest exception.41 Even then, the ITC has
35 See 19 C.F.R. § 210.8(b).
36 See id.; P. Andrew Riley and Scott A. Allen, The Public Interest Inquiry for
Permanent Injunctions or Exclusion Orders: Shedding the Myopic Lens, 17
Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 751, 763-64 (2015).
37 See Colleen Chien, Patently Protectionist?: An Empirical Analysis of Patent
Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
63, 70 (2008) (finding injunctive relief granted to prevailing patentees
in 100% of cases from 1995-2007); Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer,
Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of International Trade
Decisions, 21 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 457, 484 (2008) (finding injunctive
relief granted in 96% of cases where infringement was found).
38 See, e.g., Riley & Allen, supra note 36, at 758-59 (2015) (“Only four ITC
decisions have used the public interest exception as a means to deny an
exclusion order where it was otherwise appropriate.”); Colleen V. Chien
& Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, & the Public Interest, 98
Cornell L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (2012).
39 See Certain Fluidizing Supporting Apparatus and Components Thereof,
Inv. 337-TA-182/188, USITC Pub. 1667 (Oct. 5, 1984) (Final)
(Commission Memorandum Opinion).
40 See Certain Inclined Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereof,
Inv. No. 337-TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119 (Dec. 29, 1980) (Final)
(Commission Action and Order).
41 See Certain Toothbrushes and the Packaging Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA391, USITC Pub. 3068, at 6 (Oct. 15, 1997) (Final) (Commission
Opinion on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding) (“Toothbrushes
are not the type of product that have in the past raised public interest
concerns (such as, for example, drugs or medical devices).”); Certain
Hardware Logic Emulation Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No.
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typically required not just a clear issue of health and safety, but also
an inability of domestic industry to satisfy consumer demand.42
Despite its general focus on health and safety, the ITC has
invoked the public interest in cases involving other concerns. For
example, during an oil shortage in 1979, the ITC used the public
interest to decline to exclude importation of crankpin grinders
used to make components for internal combustion motors. The
Commission found there was an overriding national interest in
the supply of fuel-efficient automobiles in light of the oil crisis
and that the domestic industry was unable to meet demand for
these parts.43 Although this aspect of the public interest is broader
than health and safety, it still is based in part on the inability of
domestic industry to supply a product demanded by the public.
Given the decreased likelihood of obtaining injunctive relief
in district court after eBay, some commentators have claimed that
patentees are “flocking” to the ITC “in search of injunctions or
the credible threat of injunctions.”44 Although this may have been
a smart move in the past, the ITC also has started to move away
from its longstanding policy of issuing injunctions except in very
rare cases involving health and safety concerns where the domestic
industry cannot supply enough to meet demand.
Instead, the ITC has been using the public interest to effect
policy choices in the technology innovation space. Academic
commentators have encouraged the ITC to do just this. For
example, Colleen Chien and Mark Lemley suggested the ITC
should use the discretion afforded by the required public interest
inquiry to shape patent policy.45 They proposed that the ITC
consider whether the value of a patentee’s technology is small
compared to the value of the product of which it is a part and
to allow continued infringement in cases where this is the case.46
Practitioners too have advocated the tactic of invoking the public
interest at the ITC, in part because the ITC’s inability to award
money damages means a denial of an exclusion order is a “total
and complete victory” for infringers.47
Despite these calls to deny injunctive relief, the ITC had
previously shown that it understood the public interest in an
effective and reliable patent system. In 2011, the ITC issued a
partial exclusion order in a case involving mobile phones using
337-TA-383, USITC Pub. 2991, at 9 (Oct. 15, 1996) (Commission
Opinion on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding) (making the
same statement with respect to hardware logic emulators).
42 See Certain Crystalline Cefadroxil Monohydrate, Inv. No. 337-TA-293,
USITC Pub. 2391 (Mar. 21, 1990) (Final) (Commission Opinion on the
Issue Under Review, and on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding)
at 46-47 (issuing an exclusion in the case of a medical drug because a
domestic manufacturer had “sufficient capacity and resources to satisfy all
domestic demand”).
43 See Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC
Pub. 1022 (Dec. 17, 1979) (Final) (Commission Determination and
Order).
44 See Chien & Lemley, supra note 38, at 2.
45 See id. at 34-36.
46 See id.
47 See, e.g., Riley & Allen, supra note 36, at 754. Riley & Allen continue,
“Litigants before the ITC may be especially well advised to critically
evaluate and deploy the use of public interest positions.” See id.
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3G technology.48 The infringer had argued that the public
interest would best be served by denying an exclusion order
because first responders relied on GPS systems and the ED-VO
interface provided by the patented technology.49 Nevertheless,
the Commission recognized the tension between the public’s
interest in health and safety and the public’s interest in a strong
patent system: “We do not accept the general proposition that, if
the infringing activity is great enough, the public interest forbids
a remedy.”50 Rather than denying an exclusion order outright,
the ITC’s decision crafted a more nuanced remedy with limited
exceptions to the exclusion order.51
The public interest has been invoked to overrule an ITC
exclusion order at higher levels within the executive branch.
As part of the “smartphone patent wars” between Apple and
Samsung, Samsung filed a complaint with the ITC, alleging
that a number of Apple’s iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch devices
infringed Samsung’s patents.52 The ITC found infringement and
issued an exclusion order prohibiting importation, as well as a
cease-and-desist order barring sale, of the infringing devices.53
However, President Obama vetoed the order, claiming that the
public interest counseled against this relief because Samsung’s
patent was part of a technological standard and subject to fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing requirements. 54
Commentators have argued that the executive veto was “designed
as a signal to the ITC to stop issuing injunctive relief without full
consideration of the public interest at stake.”55
In October 2018, an ALJ at the ITC found that Apple
had infringed a patent owned by Qualcomm.56 But the judge
declined to issue an exclusion order, citing the public interest.57
Although the full Commission has not yet weighed in on the
48 See Certain Baseband Processor Chips & Chipsets, Transmitter and
Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and Prods. Containing
Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, 337-TA-543, USITC
Pub. 4258, at 3 (Oct. 2011).
49 See id. at 10-12, 140.
50 See id. at 153.
51 See id.
52 See In the Matter of Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless
Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices,
and Tablet Computer, Inv. No. 337-TA-794 (July 5, 2013) (Final).
53 See id.
54 See Veto of USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-794 (2013) (letter from Ambassador
Michael B. G. Froman to the Honorable Irving A. Williamson, Aug.
3, 2013), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20
Letter_1.PDF (citing the effects on “U.S. consumers” as a basis for the
veto).

matter, the judge’s findings regarding the public interest signal
a bias against companies that participate in standard setting
organizations similar to that found among district court judges.
The judge noted that two suppliers are better than one when it
comes to standardized technology and that, should the infringing
product be excluded, the supplier would be less competitive as
the technology standards progressed, which could in turn harm
national security.58
IV. Restoring the Concept of the Public’s Interest in A
Strong Patent System
Despite years of acknowledging that the public has a strong
interest in an effective and reliable patent system, and in the
technological innovations such a patent system makes possible,
judges and commentators have shifted in recent years away from
that perspective. It was easier to understand the courts’ and
ITC’s decisions to put public health and safety ahead of patent
protection in the earlier cases. After all, treating sewage and caring
for burn victims certainly fall within an ordinary view of the
public’s interest. But the recent shift at both the district courts and
the ITC is harder to understand. These institutions are subverting
traditional patent rights in the name of the public’s interest, but
without fully exploring whether there really is a public interest
problem at all.
The problem with the public interest analysis in these kinds
of cases is two-fold. First, there is little evidence that granting
injunctions would adversely affect the public’s interest. Second,
the analysis neglects the interests of patent-holder plaintiffs who
are actually parties to these cases. Either of these issues alone
would be sufficient to require a more careful look at the public’s
interest in whether injunctive relief is issued in these cases. Because
both issues are generally present, it seems unlikely that the public
interest would ever warrant trumping a patentee’s right to an
injunction in these types of cases.
The problems to which the courts and ITC point as
supporting denial of injunctive relief are at best speculative
and at worst nonexistent. Consider the ALJ’s rather tenuous
argument in the Qualcomm case described above: if an infringer
is not allowed to continue infringing, it will be less competitive
in and likely exit from a new technology area, and that will
lead to national security concerns. This chain of reasoning is
incredibly speculative. The development of the technology area in
question, 5G mobile connectivity, is being led by numerous global
companies, including Qualcomm, Intel, Samsung, Ericsson, and
others,59 and it will be implemented and rolled out by these and
countless other manufacturers. There is little evidence that any
of the important players would exit the 5G space if prohibited

56 See In the Matter of Certain Mobile Electronic Devices and Radio
Frequency and Processing Components Thereof, Inv. 337-TA-1065
(Sept. 28, 2018) (Notice Regarding Initial Determination and
Recommended Determination).

58 See In the Matter of Certain Mobile Electronic Devices and Radio
Frequency and Processing Components Thereof, Inv. 337-TA-1065
(Sept. 28, 2018), at 193-96 (Initial Determination and Recommended
Determination – Public Version). In a surprising twist, a judge in China
recently granted Qualcomm’s request for injunctive relief against Apple
in a similar patent case in that country. See, e.g., David Goldman, China
bans sale of most iPhone models after granting Qualcomm an injunction
against Apple, CNN (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/10/
tech/china-iphone-ban/index.html.

57 See id.

59 See, e.g., 5G, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5G.

55 See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Is It Time to End the USITC’s Jurisdiction Over
Patent Cases?, Patently-O (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2013/08/is-it-time-to-end-the-usitcs-jurisdiction-over-patentcases.html.
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from importing infringing products, nor is there any evidence
that national security concerns would result even if one of these
companies did stop working in the 5G space. Decisions to override
the public’s interest in a strong patent system cannot be grounded
in conjecture alone.
Some judges have also based denials of injunctive relief on a
doctrine called patent holdup, which has been proven to be false.
Whether the plaintiff is a patent assertion entity or a participant
in a standard setting organization, the concern underlying this
doctrine is that the patent holder will be able to seek unfairly
high licensing rates for use of their patents because of the threat
of injunctive relief.60 Although the doctrine of patent holdup
has been the subject of much theoretical discussion,61 empirical
research does not support it.62 Despite the fact that the existence
and impact of patent holdup has been questioned, most judges
routinely accept the theoretical concern when denying injunctive
relief in these cases.63 The public’s interest in an effective and
reliable patent system should not be ignored in favor of a doctrine
that has been shown to be false in the real world.
In addition to the public’s interest in an effective and
reliable patent system, the public also has an interest in the
very types of plaintiffs that have been denied injunctive relief.
Patent assertion entities provide a valuable service, functioning
as facilitators between inventors who cannot or do not want to
manufacture their inventions and manufacturers who wish to
use patented technologies.64 Companies that participate in and
submit technology innovations to standard setting organizations
also provide a valuable service, allowing these organizations to
arrive at the optimal technology standard for any given problem.65

The public has an interest in the viability of both patent assertion
entities and companies that participate in standard setting
organizations, because both types of plaintiffs allow for more
and better products to be made available on the market. In both
cases, denying injunctive relief may discourage plaintiffs from
continuing to participate in the field. Thus, the public has an
interest not just in a strong and reliable patent system, but in a
patent system that does not unduly discriminate against certain
types of patent holders.
The recent shift in the patent system where district court
judges and the ITC are more regularly denying injunctive relief
in the name of the public interest needs to be corrected. Rather
than basing the denial of injunctions and exclusion orders on
speculative and tenuous reasoning or on the discredited doctrine
of patent holdup, these institutions should take their mandates
to consider the public interest more seriously. The public has an
interest in an effective and reliable patent system. The public
has an interest in more technology and innovation and a strong
economy. Patent rights, including the very essence of patents—
the right to exclude—need to be respected. The public’s interest
depends on it.

60 See, e.g., Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone
Wars: Triangulating the End Game, 119 Penn St. L. Rev. 1, 4-7 (2014).
61 See id.; Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 Mich.
Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2017); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Patent Holdup & Royalty Stacking, 85 Texas L. Rev. 1991, 2010-17
(2007).
62 See, e.g., Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent
Holdup Theory, 13 J. Competition L. & Econ. 1 (2017); Jonathan M.
Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 1316, 1344 (2017) (finding that available empirical evidence does
not support the theory of patent holdup); Damien Geradin, The Meaning
of “Fair and Reasonable” in the Context of Third Party Determinations of
FRAND Terms, 21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 919, 940 (2014) (“[A]lthough
holdup and royalty stacking could occur in theory, there is little evidence
that they regularly occur in the real world.”); J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup,
Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent
Infringement: A Reply to Lemley & Shapiro, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 714, 71819 (2008) (discussing studies that question the prevalence of hold-up and
royalty stacking).
63 There is one case where a judge rejected the infringer’s argument that
patent holdup should curtail the patentee’s requested remedy, noting that
the defendants “failed to present any evidence of actual hold-up.” See
Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 2013 US Dist. LEXIS 110585 (August 6,
2013), at *63-66.
64 See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the
‘Patent Troll’ Rhetoric, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 435, 450-52 (2014).
65 See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Ignorance Over Innovation: Why Misunderstanding
Standard Setting Organizations Will Hinder Technological Progress, 56 U.
Louisville L. Rev. 159, 166-169 (2018).
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